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We are surrounded by the use of space assets, but for the most part are unaware of their impact on our lives.  On 
a daily basis, space assets contribute to our well-being and oth-
ers around the world.  Space activities have enhanced security, 
monitored the environment, improved and increased informa-
tion growth and flow, created economic growth, and changed 
the way people around the world live and work.1  Since the 
1991 Gulf War, we have also come to understand how much 
the US military depends on space.  Military forces use satellite 
information for communications, intelligence, surveillance, re-
connaissance, warning, weather, navigation, and timing.  Space 
has become the ultimate high ground upon which we depend on 
militarily and as a nation.  Because of this dependence, we must 
ensure our space assets are adequately protected.  It is clear that 
a systematic approach to analyzing the security of our space 
assets is needed.
In this article, we draw upon the insights gained from the 
information security domain when developing strategies to se-
cure organizational information assets; consider the application 
of Pipkin’s five-phase information security process in the space 
operations domain;2 and focus our discussion on the first phase 
of Pipkin’s process, which is responsible for the identification, 
valuation, and assignment of safeguards to protect resources.
A Systematic Approach: Pipkin’s Five Phases
In his book “Information Security: Protecting the Global En-
terprise,” Pipkin recognizes that information security is a criti-
cal success factor when securing an organization:
Organizations can no longer regard security as an option, only 
needed for government contracts.  Today’s business environ-
ment makes security a requirement without which the company 
will most certainly suffer damaging losses.3
While Donald L. Pipkin’s book focuses on the protec-
tion of business information systems, we believe that the les-
sons are equally applicable to Department of Defense (DoD) 
space systems.  Military systems operate on the same informa-
tion architectures as business systems, just with higher stakes 
if information becomes corrupted, lost, stolen, mismanaged, 
or unavailable.  Just like in business, information is often the 
key determinate in the success or failure of military operations. 
Today, commanders rely upon information to make high qual-
ity decisions by accessing a greater number of information re-
sources, obtaining more frequent updates from their informa-
tion resources, and by correlation between, and across, multiple 
information resources to reduce uncertainty in the battlespace. 
As a result, we must recognize critical information assets and 
take steps to insure that they are protected at a level commensu-
rate with their value.
Pipkin describes a cyclic, five-phase process to conceptualize 
the information security process: Inspection,	Protection,	Detec-
tion,	 Reaction, and Reflection. The Inspection	 phase requires 
the identification, valuation, and assignment of ownership of 
information assets critical to the organization; the Protection	
phase requires the assignment of the control measures to pro-
tect critical information assets commensurate with their value; 
the Detection phase requires the development of robust detec-
tion capabilities to insure that any breach of the organization is 
detected in a timely manner; the Reaction	phase requires that 
the organization has developed the resources and capabilities to 
quickly respond, contain, investigate, and remediate breaches; 
and the Reflection phase requires effective post-incident docu-
mentation, reporting, and accountability to assure institutional 
learning.  Neglecting any one of the five phases can expose the 
organization to excessive losses when they inevitably experi-
ence an information incident.
In the remainder of this article, we focus only on the first 
of Pipkin’s five phases: the Inspection	phase.  Based upon our 
experience, we believe that this phase is the most important and 
most frequently overlooked.  The Inspection	phase is concerned 
with the evaluation of the capabilities of the organization; under-
standing and documenting its security needs; and assessing the 
current security capabilities to protect its assets.  Specifically, 
we discuss the definition and identification of resources, threat 
assessment, vulnerability identification, evaluation of potential 
loss, assigning safeguards, and the evaluation of current status.
Defining DoD  Space Resources
The first Inspection component requires us to define and 
identify our resources.  Resources are defined as anything that 
adds value to the organization (or the country in this case) and 
whose loss would remove value.  Information resources typi-
cally include all elements of an organization’s information 
infrastructure including the systems, networks, and people. 
Anything that stores, transports, creates, or uses information in 
support of organizational objectives is a resource.  Space sys-
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tems resources include the three segments of space systems: the 
satellites themselves, the ground stations that operate and pro-
cess the data, and the communication lines used in the exchange 
of information.  They also include the people, infrastructure, 
and relationships which are harder resources to categorize and 
are often the resources that are not properly considered.  An 
adequate identification of resources is required to evaluate risk 
and apply proper security measures.4
After making a formal inventory of DoD space resources, 
ownership and value must be assigned.5  In some cases, owner-
ship is an easy answer.  In the new US National Space Policy, 
the secretary of defense and the director of national intelligence 
are assigned the duty of implementing procedures to “protect, 
disseminate and appropriately classify and declassify activities” 
to protect sensitive technologies, sources and methods, and op-
erations.6  Resource valuation is a much harder problem.  Pip-
kin believes that the owner should determine the value of the 
resource.  For military space systems the owner may be the best 
person to evaluate the type of investment made or the replace-
ment cost, but not as good at determining the impact on the 
organization if the information we depend on from space is lost. 
It is important to note that the value comes not only from un-
derstanding how the resource is used in support of the owning 
organizational mission, but how others outside of the organiza-
tion value the resource and how the owning organization ben-
efits from the outside organizations use of the information.  This 
is an important and often overlooked contribution to the value 
of a resource.  It is also intimately tied to an understanding of 
the loss that would occur in the absence of the resource that we 
discuss below in our discussion of loss analysis.
Assessing Threats
The second inspection component requires us to asses the 
threats to our resources.  A threat can be defined as a potential 
unwanted or undesirable event.  A concise definition from the 
information technology security realm is given as:  “A poten-
tial cause of an unwanted incident that may result in harm to 
a system or organization.”7  Threats can further be character-
ized by their source: natural, man-made, or technical.  Man-
made threats can be deliberate or non-deliberate.8  A deliberate 
man-made threat can be defined as an expression of intention 
to inflict evil, injury or damage.9  While it is possible to pre-
emptively address some threats, in many cases threats are out 
of our control and cannot be totally eliminated.  Interestingly, 
the Space Commission report identified an increase in threats to 
our space assets:
The relative dependence of the US on space makes its space 
systems potentially attractive targets. Many foreign nations and 
non-state entities are pursuing space-related activities. Those 
hostile to the US possess, or can acquire on the global market, 
the means to deny, disrupt or destroy US space systems by at-
tacking satellites in space, communications links to and from 
the ground or ground stations that command the satellites and 
process their data. Therefore, the US must develop and maintain 
intelligence collection capabilities and an analysis approach that 
will enable it to better understand the intentions and motivations 
as well as the capabilities of potentially hostile states and enti-
ties.  An attack on elements of US space systems during a crisis 
or conflict should not be considered an improbable act. If the US 
is to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor” it needs to take seriously the 
possibility of an attack on US space systems.10
Threats to DoD space assets affect the ground segment, 
communication link, and space segment or a combination of 
the above.  Currently, the most significant deliberate threats to 
space systems are realized on the ground.  These include threats 
to the physical, electronic, and information exchanges that in-
volve the personnel, facilities, and ground segment equipment 
and the links to and from the space segment.11  However due to 
technology sharing, material acquisitions and the purchasing of 
space services, threats to the space segment have increased and 
have started to overshadow the threats to the ground segment.12 
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2.1, Counterspace 
Operations outlines some deliberate threats.  These threats in-
clude:13
Ground system attack and sabotage using conventional 
and unconventional means against terrestrial nodes and 
supporting infrastructure.
Radio frequency (RF) jamming equipment capable of in-
terfering with space system links.
Laser systems capable of temporarily or permanently de-
grading or destroying satellite subsystems, thus interfer-
ing with satellite mission performance.
Electromagnetic pulse weapons capable of degrading or 
destroying satellite and/or ground system electronics.
Kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capable of destroy-
ing spacecraft or degrading their ability to perform their 
missions.
Information operations capabilities capable of corrupting 
space-based and terrestrial-based computer systems uti-
lized to control satellite functions and to collect, process, 
and disseminate mission data.  
In addition to the above threats, deliberate human acts can 
threaten the systems we use or the information related to the 
systems.  Examples of deliberate human threats are espionage, 
sabotage, and information system attacks like worms, viruses or 
malicious computer attacks.14  These threats are faced by busi-
ness information security managers and are not unique to space 
systems.  Private sector organizations must deal with these 
threats on a daily basis and are charged with protecting their or-
ganization from viruses, worms, Trojan horses, social engineer-
ing, phising, denial of service, theft of intellectual property, and 
failure of components.  Therefore, we believe it is wise to draw 
upon the wealth of lessons learned from private sector organiza-
tions when securing our space assets.
Besides manmade threats, non-deliberate threats can also af-
fect space assets.  Natural threats are unpredictable and include 
meteor showers, inadvertent collisions of space objects, radio 
frequency interference, space environment phenomena, and 
natural destruction to ground systems.  Again, just like informa-
tion systems, space systems are composed of software, hard-
ware, and infrastructure; all of which can fail.15  A description 
of the threat and its likelihood assist with risk analysis and are 
used by the next component of the Inspection phase of security 
planning.
•
•
•
•
•
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Identifying Vulnerabilities
The third inspection component requires us to identify vul-
nerabilities in our resources.  A vulnerability can be defined as 
a weakness in a system that can be negatively affected or be 
exploited by some threat.16  The keyword in the definition is 
“system” in its most general interpretation to include hardware, 
software, policies, procedures, and individuals.  The definition 
covers flaws in the design of systems and their implementation, 
lack of rigorous policy and procedure statements, their inad-
equate implementation, and non-compliance.  It is essential to 
realize that there are both known and unknown vulnerabilities. 
We can only address the vulnerabilities for which we are aware. 
For this reason, we must be proactive and continuously work 
towards the identification of unknown vulnerabilities.  Mitiga-
tion of risk requires that we identify all potential vulnerabilities 
so that we can address them commensurate with their value.  
Consider satellites which are built to withstand the rigors of 
launch and the harsh conditions of space.  Yet they are relatively 
fragile objects.  They are made of lightweight materials and are 
packed with sensitive equipment.17  Our reliance on these com-
plex objects makes us vulnerable to threats.  One issue with 
vulnerabilities is we don’t expect them to change or emerge, but 
they do.  Upgrades, configuration changes, and new missions 
can add or change vulnerabilities.  Just as security personnel 
continuously scan for threats, we must also plan for recurring 
vulnerability assessments.
For DoD space assets, the dependence upon access to space 
and the use of space is the biggest vulnerability.  This vulner-
ability creates opportunity for adversaries to negatively impact 
DoD space capabilities.18  Complicating this vulnerability is not 
having complete space situational awareness (SSA).  SSA is 
having the insight into an adversary’s space and counterspace 
operations.  SSA requires understanding the current and future 
conditions, constraints, capabilities, and activities in, from, or 
through space.  It includes understanding the space environ-
ment and its effects on our systems so we know if we have a 
deliberate threat.19  To improve SSA, the Air Force is focusing 
on projects to improve our space surveillance capabilities.  Proj-
ects include a space component, the Space Based Space Surveil-
lance system, upgrading land based space surveillance network, 
and providing a decision making tool that recognizes attacks on 
satellites called the Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection, and 
Reporting System.20  Former Air Force Chief of Staff, General 
John Jumper summed up this component of Inspection well: 
Identifying vulnerabilities will allow us to apply our full range 
of capabilities to ensure space superiority and continued sup-
port to joint military operations across the spectrum of conflict.  
Space superiority is as much about protecting our space assets as 
it is about preparing to counter an enemy’s space or anti-space 
assets.21
Evaluating Potential Losses
The fourth inspection component requires us to evaluate the 
potential loss of the resources.  Our space assets are used by 
commercial, civil, and military customers.  Loss to civil and 
commercial customers is measured in financial terms; while 
loss to the military is measured in operational terms.  In the 
case of the military, Mr. Tom Wilson, former Space Commis-
sion staff member, states, “as harmful as the loss or degradation 
of commercial or civil assets would be, an attack on intelligence 
and military satellites would be even more serious for the na-
tion in time of crisis or conflict.”22  For the Space Commission 
report, Mr. Wilson came up with five types of losses that could 
result from an adversary’s use of deception, disruption, denial, 
degradation, or destruction of specific space systems.  They in-
clude: 
Impairment or elimination of reconnaissance satellites 
that would reduce SSA and could lead to military surprise, 
underestimation of enemy strength and capabilities, less 
effective planning, and less accurate targeting and battle 
damage assessments. 
Impairment or elimination of missile launch detection 
satellites that would degrade the US’s ability to perform 
missile launch warning, missile defense, and would in-
crease the psychological impact of the adversary’s bal-
listic missiles. 
Impairment or elimination of satellite communications 
systems that would disrupt troop command and control 
problems at all force levels. 
Impairment or elimination of navigation satellites that 
would make troop movements more difficult, aircraft and 
ship piloting problematic, and could render many preci-
sion-guided weapon systems ineffective or useless. 
Impairment or elimination of Earth resource and weather 
satellites that would make it more difficult to plan effec-
tive military operations.23
The impact of possible attack depends on the importance of 
the resource, the timing, and duration of the loss.24  Most space 
systems are truly “one of a kind assets” and as such are critical 
to mission success and hard to replace.  While temporary de-
nial may be worked around, the destruction of our assets would 
cripple our current capabilities due to the length in production 
time and response time to launch.  In order to adequately pro-
vide SSA to commanders, it is essential for each organization 
to develop an understanding and document critical resource de-
pendencies.  This requires identification of all critical resources 
it relies upon, how and when the resources are used in support 
of their mission, and how the impact that would result from the 
loss of one or more resources.  In theory, this sounds decep-
tively simple but in reality is much more difficult to calculate. 
In many cases, a qualitative assessment can be made by the de-
cision makers who rely upon the resources, but such an estimate 
is of little value if it is not formally documented.  Documenta-
tion ensures that the value estimate can be refined over time, 
provides transparency, reduces the time required to understand 
the impact of the loss of a resource, and reduces the variance in 
loss estimation that may occur when there is no documentation. 
The main idea is that we do not want to wait until we experience 
a loss to understand what value a resource provided to the orga-
nization.  In the author’s experience, we have seen far too many 
organizations that neglect to create and maintain this important 
•
•
•
•
•
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documentation.  This is not due to ignorance, but instead it is of-
ten due to the difficulties in obtaining the required information, 
lack of personnel to collect and record the information, and fear 
that if the loss estimation is not properly secured it may be used 
as a targeting map by an adversary.  Each of these impediments 
can be overcome if we are serious about securing our assets 
and we are willing to dedicate the time, personnel, money, and 
technology necessary to address them.  Knowing the effects of 
a loss in military space capability (or our dependence on a re-
source) assists us in determining our vulnerability to the loss.25
Assigning Safeguards
The fifth inspection component requires us to assign safe-
guards, also known as controls, based upon the information 
collected during the first four Inspection components: the re-
sources of interest, threats to the resources, the vulnerabilities 
inherent in the resources, and the loss of capabilities due to the 
loss of the resources.  Assigning safeguards accurately is often 
difficult because it requires an accurate estimate of the costs 
to implement the safeguard, the value of the resource, the po-
tential loss incurred if the resource is destroyed or degraded, 
the size and likelihood of the threats, and the size and likeli-
hood of vulnerabilities.  Using poor quality information leads 
to poor risk decisions and can result a non-optimal protection 
strategy.  It should be noted that a non-optimal protection strat-
egy does not always mean that resources are under protected, it 
can also mean that certain resources have been over protected 
at the expense of mitigating other significant risks.  The overall 
goal in assigning safeguards is to identify the optimal protection 
strategy when constrained by a limited security budget.  When 
assigning safeguards, tradeoffs must be made.  Some important 
guidelines to consider are:
Protective measures implemented must work together for 
full effect.
Protection is only as good as the weakest link.
Satellite survivability measures must be kept proportional 
to the value of the satellite’s mission.
Survivability must be kept proportional to the perceived 
threat.
Safeguards must be weighed against their operational ef-
fects.26
Safeguards must be implemented to protect all segments of 
the resources or space assets.  AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Op-
erations, identifies Defensive Counterspace operations (DCS) 
as the ability to “preserve US/friendly ability to exploit space to 
its advantage via active and passive actions to protect friendly 
space-related capabilities from enemy attack or interference.”27 
Friendly space related capability includes the ground system, 
communication links and satellites.  DCS operations work to 
protect, preserve, recover, and reconstitute US and Allied space 
systems before, during and after an adversary attack.28
Passive safeguards serve to protect the assets.  They are used to 
limit the effectiveness of the hostile action against the US system. 
Some passive safeguards identified in AFDD 2-2.1 are:
Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (CC&D).
•
•
•
•
•
•
CC&D is most effective with terrestrial-based nodes. Cer-
tain types of ground-based components of space systems 
may operate under camouflage or be concealed within 
larger structures. These measures complicate adversary 
identification and targeting. 
System	Hardening. Hardening of space system links and 
nodes allow them to operate through attacks. Techniques 
such as filtering, shielding, and spread spectrum help to 
protect capabilities from radiation and electromagnetic 
pulse. Physical hardening of structures mitigates the im-
pact of kinetic effects, but is generally more applicable to 
ground-based facilities than to space-based systems due 
to launch-weight considerations. Robust networks, hard-
ened by equipment redundancy and the ability to reroute, 
ensure operation during and after information operations 
attack. 
Dispersal	 of	 Space	Systems.	For space nodes, dispersal 
could involve deploying satellites into various orbital al-
titudes and planes. For terrestrial nodes, dispersal could 
involve deploying mobile ground stations to new loca-
tions.29
These passive DCS measures are layered together to form 
a defense.  Besides passive DCS action, active DCS actions 
seek to remove or avoid the hostile effects.  These active mea-
sures rely on early detection and characterization to be effective 
countermeasures.  Active measures include: 
Maneuver/Mobility.  Satellites may be capable of maneu-
vering in orbit to deny the adversary the opportunity to 
track and target them.  They may be repositioned to avoid 
directed energy attacks, electromagnetic jamming, or ki-
netic attacks from ASATs.  Today, maneuver capability is 
limited by on-board fuel constraints, orbital mechanics, 
and advanced warning of an impending attack.  Further-
more, repositioning satellites generally degrades or inter-
rupts their mission.  The use of mobile terrestrial nodes 
complicates adversarial attempts to locate and target com-
mand and mission data processing centers.  However, 
movement of these nodes may also impact the system’s 
capability, as they must still retain line of sight with their 
associated space-based systems.  Though the use of mo-
bile technology is expanding, many of today's ground-
based systems are not mobile, making physical security 
measures essential.  
System Configuration Changes.  Space-based and ter-
restrial nodes may use different modes of operation to 
enhance survivability against attacks.  Examples include 
changing RF amplitude and employing frequency-hop-
ping techniques to complicate jamming and encrypting 
data to prevent exploitation by unauthorized users. 
Suppression of Adversary Counterspace Capabilities 
(SACC).  SACC neutralizes or negates an adversary of-
fensive counterspace system through deception, denial, 
disruption, degradation, and/or destruction.  SACC opera-
tions can target air, land, sea, space, special operations, or 
information operations in response to an attack or threat 
•
•
•
•
•
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of attack.  Examples of SACC operations include (but 
are not limited to) attacks against adversary anti-satellite 
weapons (before, during, or after employment), intercept 
of anti-satellite systems, and destruction of RF jammers 
or laser blinders.30
Other active DCS actions include actions that may target 
an adversary’s counterspace capabilities.  Such as using con-
ventional and special operations forces to attack and disable an 
adversary’s counterspace capabilities.  Having a counterspace 
capability demonstrates a capability and willingness to counter 
their efforts deterring an adversary from attacking US/friendly 
space capabilities.  Other safeguards include:
A single integrated space picture would provide an ac-
cessible picture of global and theater space capabilities, 
threats and operations to commanders, planners, and com-
bat forces, covering the full spectrum of friendly, adver-
sary, and third party space systems.  This would provide 
a comprehensive peacetime and wartime SSA capability, 
fusing information collected on all space systems, their 
ground, air, and space links and nodes to include their 
capabilities, status, vulnerability, and users. 
Physical security systems provide security and force pro-
tection for critical ground facilities and equipment.  A 
complementary mix of technology and security forces 
can effectively and efficiently mitigate specific threats in 
an ever-changing environment.  When properly deployed 
and utilized, physical security systems can represent an 
effective deterrent and provide aggressive defense against 
terrestrial node attack and sabotage. 
Air defense assets are capable of protecting launch and 
terrestrial nodes from air or missile attack.  If threatened, 
commanders should consider deploying air defense assets 
such as fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and/or an-
tiaircraft artillery to protect critical space assets (e.g., fa-
cilities and infrastructure).  A sound air defense may deter 
an adversary and most certainly will be instrumental in 
defending our forces and assets if an attack is attempted. 
Attack detection and characterization systems detect space 
system attacks and provide information on the character-
istics of the attack, especially if the source and/or capabil-
ity of the attack is unknown or unexpected.  These sys-
tems will support locating the source of the attack and the 
type of weapon used in the attack.  They may be ground-, 
air-, or space-based and either integrated with systems 
they protect or used in a stand-alone capacity.  Having 
our adversaries aware of these capabilities may influence 
their decision and act as an effective deterrent. 
Survivability countermeasures ensure critical space sys-
tems continue to operate both during and after attack.  Ex-
amples include (but are not limited to): spacecraft system 
hardening, redundant systems (both on spacecraft and 
in ground stations), spacecraft maneuverability, ground 
station mobility, and jam-resistant communication links. 
Known survivability measures may deter an adversary 
from attacking our space capabilities.31
•
•
•
•
•
Evaluating the Current Status
Currently there are more than 450 active foreign spacecraft 
in orbit, and that number is expected to reach 600 by 2010.32 
With this increase in foreign satellites, there will be new im-
aging, environmental and even navigational satellites entering 
the mix.  “Many countries are developing advance satellites 
for remote sensing, communication, navigation, imagery, and 
missile warning.  The increase in the number and capability of 
these satellites enhances a country’s command, control, com-
munication, and computers intelligence, surveillance, and re-
connaissance capabilities and in turn their warfighting capabil-
ity” which changes the environment we operate in.33  As this 
mixture changes, we must monitor this environment and our 
security, which is the last component of inspection.  Evaluating 
the effectiveness of current processes requires periodic analysis 
of procedures and testing.  If possible a complete evaluation of 
the system needs to be done from the perspectives of satellite 
to the communication links to the ground station and finally the 
deployment of the information.  An evaluation is required on 
the physical security, personnel policies and practices, business 
processes, backup and recovery measures, and network controls 
to include our operations security and information assurance, as 
noted in AFDD 2-2.1:
Operations security (OPSEC) and information assurance (IA) 
protect our space systems by limiting the availability of infor-
mation on their operations, capabilities, and limitations to our 
adversaries.  IA protects critical computer systems from intru-
sion and exploitation.  Guiding adversaries’ actions can suc-
cessfully deter effects on our space services, but OPSEC and IA 
operations are primarily focused on defending our assets from 
attack.34
Along with a review of our procedures, testing must be done 
to identify additional resources, threats, and vulnerabilities.  We 
currently test only individual aspects of DoD space systems. 
We have inspections that test the security of certain bases or fa-
cilities but not the system as a whole.  This is an area that could 
be improved—the integration and testing of our space capabili-
ties across the complete space spectrum.  A representative of 
the Langfang Army Missile Academy has said, “In future space 
wars, the main operations will consist of destructive satellite at-
tacks and counterattacks, as well as jamming and antijamming 
operations.”35  In other words, the threat is real and will con-
tinue to grow making it necessary to continuously monitor the 
situation.
Conclusion
Inspection is just one aspect of a robust security program. 
We have found that while we do a good job at protection, de-
tection, and reaction to security incidents; we often fail to do 
well during the first phase Inspection	and the last phase Reflec-
tion.  There has been a significant amount of research in the 
individual components of Inspection—resource definition, 
threat assessment, loss analysis, vulnerabilities identification, 
safeguard assignment, and evaluating the current status that can 
be applied to DoD space assets.  But we think it is vital to look 
at the whole picture to ensure there are no security gaps.  Presi-
dent George W. Bush believes our top goal is to “strengthen 
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the nation’s space leadership and ensure that space capabilities 
are available in time to further US national security, homeland 
security, and foreign policy objectives and to enable unhindered 
US operations in and through space.”36  The first step in ensur-
ing DoD space superiority is a systematic inspection of DoD 
space assets.
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